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On 11 May 2015, the Dubréka prefecture, Guinea, 
reported nine laboratory-confirmed cases of Ebola 
virus disease (EVD). None could be epidemiologically 
linked to cases previously reported in the prefecture. 
We describe the epidemiological and molecular inves-
tigations of this event. We used the Dubréka EVD reg-
isters and the Ebola treatment centre’s (ETC) records 
to characterise chains of transmission. Real-time field 
Ebola virus sequencing was employed to support epi-
demiological results. An epidemiological cluster of 32 
cases was found, of which 27 were laboratory con-
firmed, 24 were isolated and 20 died. Real-time viral 
sequencing on 12 cases demonstrated SL3 lineage 
viruses with sequences differing by one to three nt 
inside a single phylogenetic cluster. For isolated cases, 
the average time between symptom onset and ETC 
referral was 2.8  days (interquartile range (IQR):  1–4). 
The average time between sample collection and 
molecular results’ availability was 3  days (IQR:  2–5). 
In an area with scarce resources, the genetic charac-
terisation supported the outbreak investigations in 
real time, linking cases where epidemiological investi-
gation was limited and reassuring that the responsible 
strain was already circulating in Guinea. We recom-
mend coupling thorough epidemiological and genomic 
investigations to control EVD clusters.
Introduction 
The Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic in western 
Africa (2013–2016), mostly affecting Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, was the largest EVD epidemic ever 
reported [1]. The epidemic began in the area between 
the district of Guéckédou and Macenta in Guinea and 
the district of Lofa in Liberia at the end of 2013 [2-4]. By 
June 2016, more than 28,000 cases of EVD and more 
than 11,000 deaths had been reported in the three 
countries [5]. In Guinea, the epidemic had reached the 
highest transmission rates between September and 
December 2014, with peaks of up to 150 new confirmed 
cases per week. During the period April–May 2015, 9 to 
28 new confirmed cases were reported per week, most 
of which in the prefecture of Forécariah, at the costal 
border with Sierra Leone, where two different lineages 
of Ebola virus (EBOV), namely GN1 and SL3, were simul-
taneously circulating [6-11].
Guinea is administratively organised into regions, 
which are further organised into prefectures and sub-
prefectures. The prefecture of Dubréka, on the north-
ern border of the capital city Conakry, is in the region 
of the ‘Basse Guinée’ or ‘Guinée Maritime’ and has a 
population of 328,418 inhabitants distributed in the 
town of Dubréka and six sub-prefectures [12].
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Figure 1
Phylogenetic tree of sequences derived from Ebola virus disease cases, Dubréka, Guinea, April–July 2015 (n = 12 cases)
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Outbreak detection
On 11 and 12 May 2015, the prefecture of Dubréka 
reported nine laboratory-confirmed cases of EVD, none 
of which were known contacts to the two sporadic EVD 
cases who had been reported in the same prefecture 
in the previous three weeks [13,14]. Furthermore, these 
new cases were spread in three villages in the same 
sub-prefecture and could not be linked to any known 
chain of transmission. In order to minimise further 
transmission, a field investigation was launched and a 
World Health Organization (WHO) rapid response team 
was deployed to assist the Dubréka prefecture Health 
Authority (Direction Préfectorale de la Santé, DPS). The 
investigation was also assisted by the diagnostic and 
sequencing facility of the European Mobile Laboratory 
(EMLab) located within the Ebola treatment centre 
(ETC) of Coyah. The sequencing unit of the EMLab was 
set up in Coyah in May 2015 as the field laboratory to 
perform real-time viral genome sequencing from lab-
oratory-confirmed patients in Guinea, in order to sup-
port and guide field investigations [11].
Our aim is to describe the field investigation, the sup-
port provided by the real-time virus genetic characteri-
sation, and the control measures that were put in place 
by the outbreak control team.
Methods
The study was conducted within the Dubréka DPS, 
Guinea, in May – June 2015. The DPS of Dubréka investi-
gated the EVD cases, supervised contact-tracing activi-
ties, and carried out active surveillance in healthcare 
facilities. A WHO rapid response team supported these 
activities. DPS community health workers followed-up 
the contacts of EVD cases collecting information daily 
on their health status. Additionally, with the support of 
the National Coordination, local authorities and com-
munity representatives, a campaign was organised 
and put in place, including door-to-door temperature 
screening of the population and awareness activities. 
Two villages were also quarantined.
Case definitions
For the field investigation of the EVD cases in Dubréka 
prefecture we used the Guinea EVD definitions of con-
firmed, suspect, and probable cases [13]. A confirmed 
case was an individual testing positive for EBOV; a 
probable case was a deceased individual who had not 
been tested for EBOV and had an epidemiological link 
with a confirmed or a probable case. An epidemiologi-
cal link was defined as a link with a confirmed or prob-
able case or provenience from a community, which had 
experienced EVD cases in the previous three weeks 
and the staff in charge for the control of the EVD epi-
demic had reasonable grounds for suspecting EVD. We 
considered confirmed and probable cases part of the 
chain of transmission of Dubréka if epidemiological or 
phylogenetic links could be established with the clus-
ter of cases identified on 11 and 12 May. We defined 
the primary case of the transmission chain as the ear-
liest individual linked to the chain of transmission of 
Dubréka who developed the disease in the prefecture, 
but acquired the infection elsewhere.
National and international staff daily updated DPS reg-
isters of EVD cases and contacts. We used those reg-
isters, Coyah ETC patient registers, and investigation 
reports to describe the chains of transmission.
We described cases spatially by sub-prefecture and 
place of residence when a case developed symptoms 
suggestive of EVD [15] and temporally by International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) week of first 
symptom onset. We used a transmission tree to visual-
ise the transmission dynamics among cases.
We calculated (Excel 2013 and STATA 13) mean and 
standard deviations (SD) for numeric variables and pro-
portions for categorical variables, using the total num-
ber of non-missing values as the denominator.
Laboratory investigation
Virus inactivation and RNA extraction from buccal 
swabs, blood, or amniotic fluid samples were done 
using the QiAmp Viral RNA Mini Kit (Qiagen, Hilden, 
Germany) and EBOV was detected by real-time reverse 
transcription PCR (RT)-PCR with the ReaIStar Ebola virus 
RT-PCR Kit 1.0 (Altona, Germany) on Rotor gene (Qiagen) 
or Smart Cycler (Cepheid GmbH, Germany) platform, as 
previously described [11]. Sequencing was performed 
using the MinION (Oxford Nanopore Technologies, 
Oxford, UK) and sequences made available as part 
of a previous study [11]. Phylogeny was assessed by 
constructing a maximum likelihood phylogenetic tree 
under the general time-reversible (GTR) + Gamma model 
using RAxML [11]. The phylogenetic reconstructions 
Figure 2
Distribution of Ebola virus disease cases by date of 
symptom onseta, prefecture of Dubréka, Guinea, April–
July 2015 (n = 32 cases)
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were communicated to the Ebola Response National 
Coordination and to the Dubréka DPS, and field epi-
demiologists in the form of PDF and excel spreadsheet 
reports.
Ethics
The National Committee of Ethics in Medical Research 
of Guinea (permit N°11/CNERS/14) approved the use of 
diagnostic residual samples and corresponding patient 
data for research purposes. Informed consent was not 
obtained from patients, as samples and patients’ infor-
mation had been collected as part of the public health 
response to the outbreak. Epidemiological data were 
anonymised for the analysis.
Results
Epidemiological investigation
All nine confirmed cases notified on 11 and 12 May 
represented the second generation of a newly identi-
fied chain of transmission, and were epidemiologically 
linked to five previously unidentified probable cases 
who occurred in Dubréka prefecture (Figure 1). 
Description of the chain of transmission of 
Dubréka
The case who was believed to be the primary case 
(case 1) was a young person who acquired the infec-
tion in a hospital outside the Dubréka prefecture  dur-
ing hospitalisation for conditions unrelated to EVD. By 
the time their roommate was diagnosed with EVD, the 
primary case had already returned home to a village, in 
the prefecture of Dubréka and fell ill. The primary case 
was cared for by two family members (case 2 and 3). 
Upon the death of the primary case, on week 16, 2015, 
a person from the same village (case 4) prepared the 
corpse for the funerary rituals. Subsequently, cases 2, 
3 and 4 developed EVD compatible symptoms and died 
without being tested or subsequently buried by per-
sonnel trained to handle dead bodies according to the 
WHO standards aimed to prevent further community 
infections [16].
After having taken care of case 1, case 2 developed the 
disease and transmitted the infection to eight relatives 
in two villages (cases 5, 6, 8, 10, 14, 17, 18, and 19): 
one of them (case 17) died in the community while the 
others were isolated in an ETC (Figure 2).
Of the seven relatives who were isolated, four died. 
Case 17 transmitted the infection to two family mem-
bers (cases 24 and 25) who were both isolated and 
recovered. Case 18 transmitted the infection to two 
family members as well (case 22 and 23). On its way 
to an ETC, the ambulance transporting cases 22 and 23 
was attacked and set on fire by a mob of protesters. In 
the aftermath of this event, case 26 developed the dis-
ease and died in the community. Subsequently, cases 
22 and 23 were isolated in an ETC where they died. Four 
family members acquired the infection (cases 27–30) 
following contact with cases 22 and 23, and were iso-
lated. One of them died.
Case 3 transmitted the infection to two neighbours/
acquaintances (cases 16 and 7), one of whom died in 
an ETC. The other transmitted the infection to a fam-
ily member who died without being isolated (case 20), 
and to an additional family member who was pregnant 
(case 21) and, after recovering, delivered an 8 month-
old stillborn (case 32) in an ETC who tested positive 
for EVD.
After preparing the corpse of the believed primary case 
for the funerary rituals, case 4 developed EVD and 
transmitted the infection to five family members: four 
(cases 9, 12, 13 and 15) were isolated and two of them 
died. The fifth relative (case 11) died in the community 
without being tested. Investigations would only reveal 
scarce information about this case.
Case 31 lived in one of the villages affected by the 
Dubréka chain of transmission. The investigators did 
not find any link with other known cases. After identifi-
cation, the patient was isolated and died.
Figure 3
Phylogenetic tree of sequences derived from Ebola virus 
disease cases, Dubréka, Guinea, April–July 2015 (n = 12 
cases)
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Epidemiological summary
Overall, 32 cases were found, with 31 who could be 
linked to a single transmission chain including the pri-
mary case and four additional generations of cases 
(three cases in the first generation, 15 in the second, 
six in the third, and six in the fourth). The number of 
cases peaked in week 19 (4–10 May), when 10 indi-
viduals developed EVD-related symptoms; the chain of 
transmission ended on week 30, 2015, 21 days after the 
last case was discharged from an ETC. The 32 cases 
occurred among four villages. A total of 27 cases were 
confirmed, 26 acquired the infection from a relative, 
24 were isolated in an ETC, and 20 died, among whom 
eight without being isolated. The mean and median 
age of the cases was 30 years (range: 3–60 years, 
stillbirth case excluded), seven cases (stillbirth case 
excluded) were younger than 18 years. Of the 32 cases, 
19 were female. Overall, 994 contacts (mean = 31/case) 
of the cases in this chain had been listed in the contact 
tracing register. Since most of the cases lived in few 
villages and belonged to few families, 271 individuals 
had been listed two or more times as contacts for dif-
ferent cases. Among the 24 cases admitted to an ETC 
and with available information, the mean time between 
symptom onset and ETC admission was 3.2  days 
(SD:  2.2). Among the eight probable cases, who died 
in the community without being tested, the mean time 
between onset and death was 5.5 days (SD: 2.9).
Virological investigation
At the time of the Dubréka outbreak, viruses circulating 
in Guinea were derived from two lineages: one derived 
from lineage GN1, referring to viruses from early cases 
in Guinea, and the other derived from lineage SL3, cor-
responding to viruses first seen in Sierra-Leone and 
later in Conakry at the end of 2014 [11].
We sequenced a total of 13 EBOV-positive samples 
from 12 patients (cases 9, 10, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 
29, 31 and 32; Figure 3). 
The sequences obtained were all closely related to each 
other (i.e. differed by 1 to 3 single nt polymorphisms, 
SNPs), if not identical, and formed one cluster belong-
ing to the SL3 lineage [11]. The order of magnitude of 
SNPs observed in this study is in line with the mean 
EBOV evolutionary rate reported by Holmes et al. dur-
ing the 2013–2016 outbreak (1.20 x 10–3  per site per 
year (5% Bayesian credible interval: 1.13–1.27 x 10–3), 
which approximately corresponds to 1.89 nt changes 
per month (5% Bayesian credible interval: 1.78–2.00) 
[17]. We identified case 31 as part of the Dubréka clus-
ter although no clear epidemiological link could be 
established by the investigation teams. We also dem-
onstrated that the virus isolated from case 32 (stillborn 
child) was identical to the virus in the amniotic fluid 
(Figure 3) and had one SNP difference as compared 
with the blood sample of his mother (case 21).
Of the 13 EBOV-positive samples, nine were isolated 
from blood, three from swabs (cases 17, 20, 32) and 
one from amniotic fluid (case 32). The time interval 
between the sampling date and the release of sequenc-
ing data to response teams had a median of 3  days 
(IQR:  2–5) with a range of 2 to 43 days; longer time 
intervals corresponded to retrospective analysis of 
samples.
Control measures
The response was coordinated at a local level by the 
Dubréka DPS and included the activities of surveil-
lance, case management and investigation, commu-
nity engagement, social mobilisation, and safe and 
dignified burials according to the WHO standards that 
included the use of personal protective equipment, use 
of body bags, and sanitisation of family’s environment 
[16]. In order to break the chain of transmission rapidly, 
additional control measures were implemented with 
the involvement of the National Coordination, district 
and local authorities, community members and lead-
ers, and communities. Between 7 and 13 June, in the 
sub-prefecture where most of the cases originated, 
community health workers led by WHO supervisors 
performed an active door-to-door awareness campaign 
and temperature screening of the population. Cases 
of fever were further investigated. During the cam-
paign, one confirmed case was identified and isolated. 
Between 1 and 10 July, two villages where a number 
of contacts were being followed-up were quarantined; 
residents were not allowed to leave the area and peo-
ple were not allowed to enter. Food and primary health-
care were provided for free in the quarantined villages.
Discussion
The chain of transmission of Dubréka contributes to 
explain the complexity of the west African Ebola epi-
demic. The chain was active for more than 3  months 
between April and July 2015, affecting 32 individuals 
in four villages of the same prefecture. The long dura-
tion was associated with a several factors, including a 
lack of trust toward local authorities and international 
organisations, the high mobility of contacts, fears of 
stigmatisation, lack of adequate healthcare facilities, 
and a limited implementation of preventive measures, 
especially at the onset of the outbreak. The sequencing 
of the viruses from confirmed cases was very useful 
in supporting epidemiological investigations. Genomic 
surveillance allowed matching of cases with transmis-
sion chains, excluding the possibility of new virus intro-
ductions during the Dubréka outbreak, and improving 
the timeliness of investigation. Timely field-based 
genomic surveillance through Nanopore technology 
made this possible [11]. For all cases for which it was 
performed, genome sequencing confirmed the find-
ings of the epidemiological investigations and reas-
sured investigators about case 31 for whom it was not 
possible to identify a chain of transmission. Genome 
sequencing was also essential to confirm that case 32 
(the case in a stillbirth) had not only been infected with 
EVD, but that the strain infecting the baby was highly 
related to the one infecting the mother, thereby con-
firming transplacental transmission of EBOV.
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The believed primary case acquired the infection dur-
ing a hospital admission unrelated to EVD in another 
prefecture. EVD transmission in hospital settings is 
common and in some previous EVD outbreaks, hos-
pitals acted as epidemic amplifiers [18]. Most cases 
acquired the infection from a relative. In addition to 
transmission within families and nosocomial trans-
mission, transmission in the context of a funeral was 
identified in this study, consistent with what has been 
reported in previous EVD outbreaks [19,20].
The routine contact tracing activities carried out dur-
ing the outbreak investigation were intensive and on 
average more than 30 contacts per case were followed-
up, surpassing the WHO target of at least 10 contacts 
per case [21]. However, outbreak investigation activi-
ties were hindered and threatened by acts of com-
munity resistance and violence against the outbreak 
response team, including the wounding of two district 
health officials and the destruction of one ambulance. 
Community resistance can partially explain the high 
proportion of community deaths and the long time 
span between symptom onset and isolation of cases 
in the chain of transmission of Dubréka, on average 
3 days vs the recommended less than 2 days [21].
In Dubréka, during the campaign of active search of 
cases, only one confirmed case, a known contact, was 
identified, while no new cases were recognised during 
the quarantine of two villages, suggesting that the tra-
ditional surveillance activities were on the right track. 
The outbreak response probably benefited from the 
intensified activities of community sensitisation dur-
ing the campaign of active search of cases and during 
quarantine. Furthermore, the presence in the field of 
local, regional and national leaders showed a political 
commitment and increased the perception of risk in the 
community.
Our investigation suffered from some limitations. First, 
we cannot exclude that one or more EVD cases were 
missed during the investigation; however, no new 
cases were reported in Dubréka after July 2015. Under-
ascertainment of EVD cases was an enormous chal-
lenge during the whole EVD western Africa outbreak. 
Second, differences in cases’ spelling of names and 
related information were identified between the data-
bases kept at local, ETC, and national levels. This has 
been an issue identified in all of Guinea and not only in 
Dubréka. We reviewed the records of the field investi-
gations to clarify inconsistencies and made sure these 
differences did not affect the quality of the study. The 
Guinea ring vaccination cluster-randomised trial to 
test efficacy of a new Ebola vaccine was ongoing in 
Dubréka during this outbreak [22,23]. The trial had a 
blind-design and the Dubréka DPS was not informed 
of which cases were vaccinated. The trial might have 
had an effect in interrupting part of the transmission 
chains, but we are not able to quantify this effect.
Conclusions
The rapid investigation of the initially identified EVD 
cluster and the thorough surveillance activities per-
formed in the prefecture of Dubréka for more than 
3  months were essential to the stop transmission. 
Virus genomic characterisation supported the epide-
miological investigation by: (i) confirming and corrobo-
rating epidemiological investigations; (ii) reassuring 
that all cases were associated with a single EBOV line-
age (SL3), already circulating in Guinea, and therefore 
no novel virus introduction had occurred; (iii) linking 
case 31, for whom epidemiological information was 
limited, to the ongoing chains of transmission; (iv) 
confirming trans-placental transmission of EBOV. This 
investigation shows the feasibility and the utility of 
genetic characterisation in supporting EVD field out-
break investigations in settings characterised by scar-
city of resources. These are characteristics that make 
this approach particularly suitable for the investigation 
in situations of new flare-ups, such as the ones that 
challenged surveillance systems in Guinea, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone following the end of the outbreak.
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